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This paper analyzes the impact of relaxing fertility controls and expanding social
security in China. We develop an overlapping generations model in which fertility
decisions and capital accumulation are endogenously determined in the presence
of social security. In our model, children are an alternative savings technology—as
they transfer resources to their retired parents. Important feedback links arise
between fertility and social security variables: an expansion of social security
beneﬁts reduces fertility—partially offsetting the effects of relaxing the one-child
policy. The feedback loop between social security variables and fertility suggests
that abandoning fertility restrictions may not be as effective in helping to ﬁnance
China’s intended pension reform, especially if children are an important source of
old-age support. The sustainability of the pension system is particularly at risk in
the event of a growth slowdown. The objective of pension reforms may also be
incongruent with other reforms, such as ﬁnancial liberalization and ﬁnancial
integration. [JEL H55, J11, J13, E21]
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The Chinese government is currently undertaking important social securityreforms. At present, about half of urban workers are covered by the pension
program, whereas the vast majority of the rural area remains uncovered. Nation-
wide, only 31 percent of China’s total workforce, urban and rural combined, is
eligible for a public pension of any kind. Coincidentally, intrafamily support, on
which most Chinese elderly traditionally relied, is weakening as a consequence of
families having fewer children. Without imminent reforms, tens of millions of
Chinese could arrive in old age without pensions or adequate family support in the
next few decades. As a result, the government set out a goal to make the pension
program national in scope—reaching full coverage by the year 2020.1
However, the challenge of building a national pension system could hardly be
more daunting. Demographic aging, due to fertility controls, makes the reform
all at once more pressing and more delicate. The “one-child policy,” whose
implementation started in the early 1980s,2 indeed fostered a rapid demographic
transition in China and will soon lead to a sharp rise in the ratio of retirees to
middle-aged workers: as the share of the elderly in the total population is expected
to double between now and 2050, the old age dependency ratio could almost triple
and come close to one (Table 1). Concerns over pressure on the social security
program are echoed in works such as Feldstein (1999), Barr and Diamond (2010),
Nakashima, Howe, and Jackson (2009), and Song and others (2013), among others.
In November 2013, the Third Plenary Session announced the much-anticipated
relaxation of the one-child policy—partly to slowdown the aging of the society,
and partly to help relieve pressure on the ﬁnancing of social security. But to what
extent can the relaxation of fertility controls actually aid pension reforms?
The question needs to be addressed in an appropriate framework that takes into
account China’s particular institutional and social norm. One important aspect of
the Chinese society is that children are often the main source of old-age support.
Table 1. Demographic Structure in China
1970 2010 2050
Share of young (% of individuals aged 0–30) 65 42 28
Share of middle-aged (% of individuals aged 30–60) 28 44 39
Share of elderly (% of individuals above 60) 7 14 33
Median age 19.7 34.5 48.7
Fertility (number of children per woman, urban areas) 3.18 1.04 n/a
Notes: UN World Population Prospects (2011). The fertility number for the year 1970 (resp. 2010)
corresponds to the average fertility over the period 1965–70 (resp. 2004–09).
1Hu Jintao’s report at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party, October 15, 2007.
2The one-child policy aimed at curbing the rapid population growth following Mao’s pronatality
program. Household-level data (Urban Household Survey) indicates a strict enforcement of the policy
in urban areas in China: over the period 2000–09, 96 percent of urban households that had children
had only one child. The policy however was signiﬁcantly less strict in rural areas. According to
Census data, the urban fertility rate fell from a bit above 3 in 1970 to close to 1 by 1982 (see
Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin, 2014).
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Until recently, the absence of social safety net has meant that retirees relied to a
large extent on children’s support. According to Census data in 2005, family
support is the main source of income for more than half of the elderly (65+) urban
population (see Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin, 2014). In rural areas where
pension coverage is particularly low, family support is even more essential for the
elderly (see Chapter 3 in Cai and others, 2012). However, to the extent that there is
some substitutability between social security and reliance on children, people may
decide to have fewer children when social security beneﬁts increase. This might in
turn reduce future contributions necessary to sustain the reform.
In order to take these considerations into account, we develop a framework that
allows for endogenous fertility in an overlapping generations model with capital
accumulation and intergenerational transfers—in the form of family support and social
security.3 In the model, individuals decide on how many children to bear at the end of
their youth period. In middle age, they raise children (at a cost), contribute to the
pension program, and transfer resources to their parents. Old retirees consume all
available resources, which include social security beneﬁts and offspring’s transfers.
This economy is characterized by three key relationships in the steady state.
The ﬁrst is a positive relationship between fertility and interest rates based on optimal
savings and investment decisions. A greater number of children increases the
marginal productivity of capital and thus investment. Moreover, it is associated
with higher expenditures and larger transfers in old age, both of which lead to lower
savings. Higher fertility thus leads to higher interest rates. The second condition is a
negative relationship based on optimal fertility choices: a higher interest rate lowers
the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of children (relative to capital) and hence discourages fertility.
The third key relationship is determined by the sustainability of the social security
system, which embeds the impact of fertility and growth on the viability of the
program. We show analytically how the interactions of these relationships conjoin to
determine the interest rate, fertility, and social security contribution rates in the long
run. Children in this framework are both “consumptions goods” and “investment
goods”—in the sense that they transfer resources to support their parents in old age.
A change in the social security system alters incentives to have children, both
because social security variables (taxes and beneﬁts) alter consumption and thus the
demand for children, and because social security affects the investment return on
children—via changes in the interest rate, or to the extent that more generous pension
beneﬁts can crowd out intrafamily transfers to the elderly.
Our framework applied to China shows that relaxing the one-child policy can
aid an expansion of pension through an increase in fertility—but that rise is partly
offset through three channels. First, insofar as children are considered investment
goods, greater reliance on social security and less transfers coming from children
means that desired fertility drops. Second, to the extent that children are also
consumption goods, social security expansion, ﬁnanced partly by higher taxes,
3Our theory relates to earlier work linking fertility and intergenerational (public or private)
transfers such as Nishimura and Zhang (1992), Boldrin and Jones (2002), Boldrin, de Nardi, and
Jones (2005), Ehrlich and Kim (2005) and Yew and Zhang (2009).
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lowers consumption in middle age and therefore also optimal fertility. Third, the rise
in the interest rate occasioned by a fall in national savings also leads to a reduction in
desired fertility. Lower fertility requires higher tax rates, which further lowers fertility
—and so and so forth. This feedback loop between social security variables and
fertility suggests that the effectiveness of abandoning the one-child policy in terms of
its impact on ﬁnancing the pension reforms may be overstated—when endogenous
fertility considerations are ignored. In the event of a growth slowdown—a likely
scenario in China in the coming decades—the circumstances would only become
worse. The fertility increase as a consequence of the birth-control relaxation is even
more limited because a slower rate of growth reduces expected future transfers—and
thus the beneﬁts of having children. Financing the social security expansion thus
requires an even more signiﬁcant rise in taxes.
We also investigate how social security reforms might interact with capital
markets reforms. We consider two reforms (1) domestic ﬁnancial liberalization
and (2) lifting capital controls. Those two reforms have qualitatively similar
consequences as they both increase repressed interest rates. By raising the return on
savings, they reduce the beneﬁts from children and depress further fertility. As a
consequence, they exert further pressure on the ﬁnancing of social security. In our
framework, the Chinese government faces a severe tension between expanding the
generosity of the pension system and deepening capital markets liberalization—
particularly so if growth slows.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I describes the basic elements of the
framework and the relationships governing the key endogenous variables in the
economy. An analytically tractable case of a PAYGO system in the long run is
analyzed in Section II. Section III shows the dynamics of the model under various
policy experiments. Section IV concludes. All proofs are relegated in the Appendix.
I. Model
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of agents who live for three
periods: youth (y), middle age (m), and old age (o). Agents supply one unit of labor
when young and middle-aged, and retire when old. Before entering middle age,
individuals decide how many children to have. Let nt denote the number of children
(per young individual) born at the end of period t. Demographics evolves according
to Lo, t+2= Lm, t+1= Ly, t= nt−1Ly, t−1, where Lγ, t denotes the size of generation
γ∈{y,m, o} in period t.
Production
Let Kt−1 denote the aggregate capital stock at the beginning of period t and
et Ly, t+Lm, t the total labor input employed in period t, where et denotes the relative
efﬁciency of young workers (et<1). The gross output is
Yt ¼ Kαt - 1 At etLy; t + Lm; t
  1 - α
;
where At is labor-augmenting productivity, and 0<α<1. Productivity grows at an
exogenous (gross) rate gA, t, so that At= gA, tAt−1.
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Factor markets are competitive. Thus, the wage rates per unit of labor in youth
and middle age are
wy;t ¼ et 1 - αð ÞAtkαt - 1; wm;t ¼ 1- αð ÞAtkαt - 1; (1)
where kt−1≡Kt−1/[At(etLy, t+ Lm, t)] denotes the capital-effective-labor ratio. The
rental rate earned by capital in production equals the marginal product of capital,
rK, t= αkt−1α−1. We assume full depreciation of capital for simplicity.4 Therefore the
gross rate of return earned between period t−1 and t is
Rt ¼ αkα - 1t - 1 : (2)
The Social Security System
Our modelling of the social security system is ﬂexible enough to encapsulate a pay-
as-you-go system (PAYGO), a fully-funded system, or more generally some
combination of the two. Young and middle-aged agents in period t pay a Social
Security tax proportional to their labor income, at the contribution rate τt. A retiree
in period t receives social security beneﬁts in the amount of σtwm,t−1, where σt
denotes the replacement ratio in that period.
The government runs the social security system and can accumulate assets in a
trust fund to ﬁnance the system. Let Bt≥0 denote the government’s asset position at
the end of period t. The government’s ﬂow budget constraint in period t+1 is
τt + 1ðLy;t + 1wy;t + 1 + Lm;t + 1wm;t + 1Þ +Rt + 1Bt ¼ Lo;t + 1σt + 1wm;t +Bt + 1: (3)
The left-hand side of the equation represents the sources of funds for the Social
security system in period t+1, which consist of Social Security taxes plus gross
returns on assets. The right-hand side represents the uses of funds by the Social
Security system in that period, including retirement beneﬁts paid to the elderly and
the purchase of capital to hold in the trust fund. Using Equations (1) and (2), the
government’s ﬂow budget constraint can be rewritten as
nt - 1gA;t + 1ð1 + ntet + 1Þ
1 + nt - 1et
kt
kt - 1
 α
ð1- αÞτt + 1 - bt + 1
 
+ αkα- 1t bt
¼ 1 - α
1+ nt - 1et
σt + 1; (4)
where bt≡ (Bt /Yt) denotes government assets as a share of GDP. Equation (4)
governs the dynamics of the social security system, deﬁned by the set of variables
{bt, τt, σt}, for a given evolution of the endogenous state variables {kt, nt}. This
equation makes clear the impact of growth and the interest rate on the ﬁnancing of
the social security system. Higher growth between periods t and t+1—driven
by productivity, demographics, or capital accumulation—tends to relax the
government’s budget constraint through its impact on tax revenues relative to
4This assumption is rather innocuous and quantitatively unimportant given that a period
corresponds to one generation.
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beneﬁt spendings—although it also implies higher investment into capital assets
for a given bt+1>0. If the government holds a positive asset position (bt>0), a
higher rate of return on capital (αktα−1) also increases revenues.
Households
Consider an individual who is young in period t. The individual earns the
competitive wage rate wy, t when young, and wm, t+1 in the next period. At the end
of period t, the agent decides on the number of children nt to bear. In the next
period, the agent pays the cost of raising kids and makes a transfer to his elderly
parents, for a total amount of Tm, t+1. When retired, the individual consumes all
available resources, which consist of gross return on accumulated assets, social
security transfers (σt+2wm, t+1), and transfers received from children To, t+2. The
lifetime utility of the agent, which includes the utility derived from children, is
Ut ¼ log cy;t
 
+ vlog ntð Þ + βlog cm;t + 1
 
+ β2log co;t + 2
 
where 0<β<1, and v>0 reﬂects the preference for children. The agent faces the
following sequence of budget constraints:
cy;t + ay;t ¼ 1 - τtð Þwy;t
cm;t + 1 + am;t + 1 ¼ 1 - τt + 1ð Þwm;t + 1 +Rt + 1ay;t - Tm;t + 1
co;t + 2 ¼Rt + 2am;t + 1 + σt + 2wm;t + 1 + To;t + 2; ð5Þ
where aγ, t denotes the net asset holdings at the end of period t by an agent of
generation γ.
Intrafamily Transfers
The cost of raising kids falls in the mold of a time cost that is proportional to
middle-aged labor income and to the number of children, ϕntwm, t+1, where ϕ>0.
These costs can be interpreted as “mouth-to-feed” costs and education expenses.5
Transfers from a middle-aged individual to his parents in period t+1 amount to a
fraction ψt+1(nt−1ϖ−1/ϖ) of the wage rate wm, t+1, whereϖ∈(0, 1]. Ascending transfers
constitute an important feature of Chinese society (see Choukhmane, Coeurdacier,
and Jin, 2014). As in Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin, 2014, we assume that the
fraction of labor income transferred to parents is (weakly) decreasing in the number
of siblings—to capture the possibility of free-riding among siblings who share the
burden of parent support.6 The extent of free-riding is measured by 1−ϖ.
The magnitude of transfers toward parents depends on the replacement rate,
5Implicitly, we assume that transfers from the middle-aged to their children are consumed in an
interim childhood period, between the time agents are born and the time they enter the labor market—
or equivalently, the cost of raising kids is a pure resource cost. Having the transfers appear in the
young’s budget constraint would make no substantial difference as long as the credit constraint on the
young is binding (see next paragraph).
6See Boldrin and Jones (2002) for a model where ascending transfers are decreasing in the
number of siblings as the outcome of a strategic game between siblings.
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ψt+1=Ψ(σt+1), with Ψ(.)>0 decreasing and convex. This assumption exogenously
captures the possibility that increasing social security beneﬁts might crowd out
intrafamily support.
The combined amount of resources transferred in period t+1 by a middle-aged
agent to his children and parents thus satisﬁes
Tm;t + 1 ¼ ϕnt +ψt + 1
nϖ - 1t - 1
ϖ
 
wm;t + 1: (6)
When retired, the agent receives transfers from his nt children, for a total amount
To;t + 2 ¼ ψt + 2
nϖt
ϖ
wm;t + 2: (7)
Credit Constraints
Young agents are subject to credit constraints: a young agent in period t can only
borrow up to a fraction θt of the present value of his future labor income. Tight
credit constraints are relevant in the case of China, where credit markets are still
underdeveloped (see Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin, 2014). Domestic ﬁnancial
liberalization can be interpreted as an increase in θt over time. For simplicity, we
proceed under the assumption that the credit constraint on the young is binding in
all periods, and thus7
ay;t ¼ - θt wm;t + 1Rt + 1 : (8)
Middle-Aged Savings
The assumption of log utility implies that the optimal consumption by a middle-
aged agent is a constant fraction of his intertemporal wealth, which consists of
disposable income (current wage net of Social Security tax and previous period
debt repayment), minus transfers to children and parents, plus the present value of
transfers (public and private) to be received in old age:
cm;t + 1 ¼ 11 + β 1 - τt + 1 - θt -ϕnt -
ψt + 1nϖ - 1t - 1
ϖ
 
wm;t + 1 +
nϖt
ϖ
ψt + 2wm;t + 2
Rt + 2
+
σt + 2wm;t + 1
Rt + 2
 	
:
It follows from Equation (5) that the optimal asset holding of a middle-aged
individual is
am;t + 1 ¼ β1 + β 1 - τt + 1 - θt -ϕnt -
ψt + 1nϖ - 1t - 1
ϖ
-
σt + 2
βRt + 2
 
wm;t + 1 -
nϖt
βϖ
ψt + 2wm;t + 2
Rt + 2
 	
:
(9)
7For a given value of θt, the constraint is binding if the lifetime income proﬁle is steep enough (e
small enough and/or gA high enough). We check in our simulations that the constraint is indeed
always binding.
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Equation (9) shows the partial equilibrium effects of fertility, the social security
system, and the interest rate on the middle-aged’s savings. Higher fertility (nt) tends
to reduce savings because of higher spending on children, and because of higher
transfers received from children in the future. Similarly, higher social security
contributions τt+1 and a higher expected replacement rate σt+2 reduce the amount of
savings, by lowering current disposable income and increasing future wealth,
respectively. The income and substitution effects associated with changes in the
interest rate (Rt+2) cancel out under the assumption of log utility—but a lower
interest rate, by increasing the present value of future transfers, implies lower
savings (“wealth effect”).
Fertility
Fertility decisions hinge on equating the marginal utility of bearing an additional
child to the net marginal cost of raising the child:
v
nt
¼ β
cm;t + 1
ϕwm;t + 1 -
ψt + 2nϖ - 1t wm;t + 2
Rt + 2
 
: (10)
The right-hand side is the net marginal cost, in utility terms, of having an
additional child. In pecuniary terms, the net marginal cost is equal to the cost of
rearing one extra child, ϕwm, t+1, less the present value of the impact of one
additional child on the amount of transfers received in old age, ∂To, t+2/∂nt. In
this framework, children are at once “consumption goods” (through the
parameter v) and “investment goods” (through ψt+2). As of the end of period t,
the return on children as a savings vehicle, for ﬁxed parameters ϕ and ψt+2,
depends on the ratio of wage growth to interest rate, wm, t+2/(wm, t+1Rt+2). A fall
in this ratio reduces the returns to investing in children, and thus discourages
fertility. Equation (10) can be rewritten as
v
nt
¼ β 1+ βð Þ ϕk
α
t -
ψt + 2
α n
ϖ - 1
t gA;t + 2kt + 1
 
1- τt + 1 - θt -ϕnt - ψt + 1ϖ n
ϖ - 1
t - 1
 
kαt +
ψt + 2
αϖ n
ϖ
t gA;t + 2kt + 1 +
σt + 2
α k
1 -α
t + 1 k
α
t
;
(11)
and is the ﬁrst equation describing the dynamics of the two endogenous state
variables {kt, nt}, for a given path of social security variables {bt, τt, σt}t≥0.
Capital Market Equilibrium
The market clearing condition for capital equalizes the net asset holdings by
households and the government to the aggregate capital stock:
Ly;t + 1ay;t + 1 + Lm;t + 1am;t + 1 +Bt + 1 ¼ Kt + 1:
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Using Equations (8) and (9) along with Equations (1) and (2), the capital
market clearing condition can be rewritten as
ntgA;t + 2kt + 1
"
1 + et + 2nt + 1ð Þ + θt + 1 1 - αα +
1
1 + β
ψt + 2
ϖ
nϖ - 1t
1 - α
α
#
¼ βk
α
t
1 + βð Þ
"
1 - τt + 1 - θt -ϕnt -
ψt + 1
ϖ
nϖ - 1t - 1

 
ð1 - αÞ - σt + 2
β
1 - α
α
k1 - αt + 1
+
1 + β
β
1+ et + 1ntð Þbt + 1
#
; ð12Þ
which gives the second equation describing the dynamics of the two endogenous
state variables {kt, nt} for a given path of social security variables. The dynamics of
the economy is thus deﬁned by the equations for optimal fertility and capital market
equilibrium, (equations (11) and (12)), along with a path of social security variables
{bt, τt, σt}t≥0 that satisﬁes the government’s budget constraint (equation (4)) in
every period. We now turn to the analysis of the model at its steady state.
Steady State
The steady state is characterized by constant productivity and credit condition
parameters (et= e, gA,t= gA, and θt= θ), constant social security variables (bt= b,
τt= τ, σt= σ), and constant state variables (kt= k, nt= n). To obtain analytical
solutions for the steady state, we make the following additional assumptions.
Assumption 1 No free-riding between siblings: ϖ= 1.
Assumption 2 No ﬁrst-period labor income: et= 0 in every period.
Assumption 3 τ<1−θ−Ψ(0).
The ﬁrst two assumptions are made for analytical convenience. Assumption 3
puts an upper bound on the social security contribution rate and ensures that
individuals want a strictly positive number of children. With these assumptions we
obtain the two fundamental relationships linking the interest rate and fertility in the
steady state, for a given social security system.
KK Curve
The ﬁrst relationship derives from the capital market equilibrium condition,
Equation (12), and captures optimal savings decisions:
RKKðnÞ ¼ ngA Θ +ψσð Þ + σβ 1 - τ - θ -ϕn -ψσð Þ + 1 + βð Þ b1 - α
; (13)
where ψσ≡Ψ(σ) and Θ≡ (1+β)((α/(1−α))+θ). The KK curve is upward sloping
with respect to n, encapsulating four different channels through which the rate of
return is positively linked to fertility. The ﬁrst is the standard effect that higher
population growth (higher fertility) increases the marginal productivity of capital.
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The second is that a greater number of children raises total expenditures, which
tends to reduce the savings of the middle-aged and drive up the rate of return (term
ϕn in the denominator). This channel disappears when the cost of raising kids ϕ
goes to zero. The third channel is related to ascending intrafamily transfers. With
higher fertility, middle-age savers expect to receive larger transfers in old age—
which lowers their savings and increases the interest rate (term ngAψσ in the
numerator). This channel disappears when ψσ goes to zero.8 Fourth, higher fertility
increases the proportion of young borrowers and lowers aggregate savings through a
composition effect. This effect is dampened when θ is small. Hence, the steepness of
the KK curve with respect to n is larger whenever the cost of children (ϕ) is large,
ascending altruism (ψσ) is large, or credit constraints are not too tight (large θ).
Partial equilibrium comparative statics on RKK, holding the social security
variables (b, τ, σ) and fertility n ﬁxed, yield
∂RKK
∂θ
>0;
∂RKK
∂gA
>0;
∂2RKK
∂ψσ∂gA
>0:
Tighter credit constraints (lower θ) lead to less borrowing by young individuals and
thus lower the interest rate. Higher productivity growth gA increases the interest
rate by raising the marginal productivity of capital. This effect tends to be
magniﬁed whenever ascending altruism (ψσ) is large. The reason is that higher
growth increases the future transfers received from children in old age and
therefore lowers incentives to save in middle age.
NN Curve
The second key relationship derives from Equation (11) and captures optimal
fertility decisions:
RNNðnÞ ¼ ngAψσ + λσnϕ - λ 1 - τ - θ -ψσð Þ
; (14)
where λ≡ (v/(v+β(1+β)). Differentiating with respect to n yields
∂RNN
∂n
¼ - λ 1- τ - θ -ψσð ÞgAψσ + σϕ
nϕ - λ 1- τ - θ -ψσð Þ½ 2
<0:
Assumption 3 ensures that the NN curve is downward sloping with respect to n.
There are essentially two forces driving this result. First, to the extent that children
are “investment goods,” a higher interest rate tends to lower the returns from
children and thus discourages fertility (term in gAψσ). This effect disappears when
ψσ goes to zero: fertility is more sensitive to interest rate changes when ascending
8The simplifying assumption ϖ= 1 (Assumption 1) matters for the response of the interest rate
to changes in fertility. With ϖ∈(0, 1), the third channel (“future transfer” channel) through which
higher fertility increases the interest rate is dampened, as transfers received in old age increase less
than proportionally with the number of children. On the other hand, ϖ<1 also implies that higher
fertility reduces ascending transfers from the middle-aged, thereby increasing their savings and
lowering the interest rate.
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intrafamily transfers are important. Second, insofar as children are also “consump-
tion goods,” higher interest rates, by lowering the present value of future social
security beneﬁts and thereby intertemporal wealth, lower consumption—and hence
also fertility (term proportional to σϕ). This effect disappears in the absence of
social security σ= 0.
Inverting Equation (14), we obtain the following partial equilibrium com-
parative statics on the steady-state level of fertility n, holding the social security
system (b, τ, σ) and the interest rate ﬁxed:
∂n
∂ϕ
<0;
∂n
∂v
>0;
∂n
∂θ
<0;
∂n
∂gA
>0:
These inequalities indicate how the NN curve shifts in response to changes in some
of the parameters of the model. For a given R, a higher cost of raising kids or a
lower preference for children reduces fertility. A loosening of credit constraints
(higher θ) reduces disposable income for consumption when middle-aged and thus
the demand for children. Most relevant to our analysis is the effect of growth (gA): a
growth slowdown, holding R ﬁxed, is associated with lower returns on children and
thus lower fertility. This effect is absent when ψσ= 0.
Taking the social security system as given, the KK and NN curves together
determine a unique steady-state equilibrium.
Proposition 1 For a given social security scheme (b, τ, σ), a steady-state
equilibrium for fertility and the interest rate exists and is unique. The state level
of fertility n lies in the interval ðn; nÞ, where
n  λ 1- τ - θ -ψσ
ϕ
;
n  1 - τ - θ -ψσ
ϕ
+
1 + β
βð1- αÞ b>n:
Steady State under Laissez-Faire
We now characterize fertility and the interest rate (n0, R0) in the laissez-faire steady
state—that is, in the absence of a social security system (τ= σ= b= 0). This
benchmark case is useful to build intuition on the mechanisms of the model.
Letting ψ0≡Ψ(0), we obtain from Equations (13) and (14)
R0 ¼ λΘ + β + λð Þψ0βϕð1 - λÞ
 
gA;
n0 ¼ λΘ + β + λð Þψ0Θ + 1 + βð Þψ0
 
1 - θ -ψ0
ϕ
:
FERTILITY POLICIES AND SOCIAL SECURITY REFORMS IN CHINA
381
A fall in productivity growth gA lowers the equilibrium interest rate as the
marginal productivity of capital falls. However, the rate of productivity growth
does not affect fertility under laissez-faire.9 A loosening of credit constraints
(higher θ, also implying higher Θ) leads to lower fertility and a higher interest
rate (through higher borrowing of the young and lower disposable income of the
middle-aged-savers). Figure 1 depicts the laissez-faire equilibrium under two
sets of parameter values. In the top panel, children are mostly “investment
goods” and intrafamily transfers are the main motive driving the demand for
children (v→0). The NN curve is almost horizontal in that case: any movement
of the KK curve will have a very large impact on fertility, and very little impact
on the interest rate. To the opposite, when preference for children is the main
motive for fertility (v>0 and ψ0→0), the NN curve is almost vertical in the
equilibrium region (bottom panel): any movement of the KK curve will have a
very large impact on the interest rate, and very little impact on fertility. Hence a
rise in the replacement rates which shifts the KK curve leftward will engender
very different effects on the economy depending on whether intrafamily
transfers are important or not.
II. Social Security Policies: Steady-State Analysis
We now proceed to analyze how the introduction of a social security system
affects fertility and the interest rate at the steady state in our framework. Under
Assumption 2, the government’s budget constraint, Equation (11), becomes
σ
ngA
- τ ¼ R
ngA
- 1
 
b
1 - α
(15)
in the steady state. The left-hand side is the (primary) government deﬁcit in a given
period, where expenditures are captured by the replacement rate σ divided by the
rate of demographic growth (that is, ratio of contributing workers to retirees) times
the rate of productivity growth. Higher economic growth (either through fertility or
productivity) relaxes the government’s budget constraint. In a PAYGO system
(b= 0), the contribution and replacement rates must satisfy the condition τ=
σ/(ngA). If the government holds a positive asset position (b>0), the government
can use the return on its assets to ﬁnance a primary deﬁcit if the interest rate is high
compared with economic growth R>ngA. On the contrary, in the case in which
R<ngA, the government must run a primary surplus to maintain its level of capital
asset holdings to GDP constant.
To determine the steady-state equilibrium with social security, we take two of
the social security variables (b, τ, σ) as exogenously given and let the third one
adjust endogenously. In what follows, we focus on scenarios in which the
9This result is the outcome of two counteracting effects that exactly offset each other. On the one
hand, lower productivity growth reduces incentives to have children (NN curve shifts to the left). On
the other hand, it also reduces the marginal productivity of capital and the interest rate (KK curve
shifts downward), which increases fertility. Note that a change in gA leaves the ratio of wage growth
to interest rate (gA/R), and therefore the incentives to have children, unaffected.
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government targets a given level of asset over GDP (b) and a certain replacement
rate (σ), while letting the Social Security tax rate (τ) adjust.10
Figure 1. Steady-State Equilibrium under Laissez-Faire
Notes: Low v and high ψ0. Parameters values: β= 0.99 (annual basis), gA−1= 4.5 percent (annual
basis), v= 1 percent, θ= 1 percent, α= 30 percent, ϕ= 8 percent, ψ0= 20 percent; High v and low ψ0.
Parameters values: β= 0.99 (annual basis), gA−1= 4.5 percent (annual basis), v= 15 percent, θ= 1 percent,
α= 30 percent, ϕ= 8 percent, ψ0= 2 percent.
10The analysis of the steady state in scenarios where the government lets σ (resp. b) adjust for
given (τ, b) (resp. given (τ, σ)) was included in an earlier version of the paper and is available upon
request.
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Fertility and Social Security Taxes in a PAYGO System
We begin with a PAYGO system (b= 0) where the government targets a certain
replacement rate σ ¼ σ. Equations (13)–(15) together determine the equilibrium
fertility, interest rate, and contribution rate in the steady state. Letting ψσ  ΨðσÞ,
the equilibrium ðnσ;Rσ; τσÞ must satisfy
Rσ¼ nσgA Θ +ψσð Þ + σβ 1 - τσ - θ -ϕnσ -ψσð Þ
; (KK)
Rσ ¼ nσgAψσ + λσnσϕ - λ 1- τσ - θ -ψσð Þ
; (NN)
τσ ¼ σnσgA : (SS)
As shown in Lemma A.1 in the Appendix—provided that σ is below a certain
threshold, a steady-state equilibrium exists.11 Next, we characterize how the
targeted level of the contribution rate σ affects the steady state. To this end, we
introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 4 |Ψ′(0)|<Mϕ/gA, where M (deﬁned in the Appendix) is strictly
positive for α≥(β)/(1+2β).
This assumption limits the fall in family transfers toward parents when the
replacement rate increases—so that the total share of middle-aged wages dedicated
to intergenerational transfers τσ +ψσð Þ rises when the replacement rate increases.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 4, an increase in the replacement rate σ in the
neighborhood of σ ¼ 0 causes fertility to fall: ððdnσÞ=ðdσÞÞ< 0. The contribution
rate increases with an elasticity above unity: ððd logτσÞ=ðd logσÞÞ>1. The impact
on the interest rate Rσ is ambiguous.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, a stronger result (global rather than local)
holds under the additional restriction that v=ψσ<βððαÞ=ð1αÞ + θÞ - 1: in that case,
any sustainable increase in σ leads to a fall in fertility. It is useful to illustrate
graphically the main forces leading to this result in terms of the KK and NN curves.
Holding fertility constant, a rise in the replacement rate lowers aggregate savings:
the KK curve shifts to the left, lowering n along the NN curve. Moreover, if more
generous pension beneﬁts crowd out intrafamily support (Ψ′< 0), incentives to
have children are reduced: the NN curve also shifts to the left (downwards), causing
a further drop in fertility. As σ increases and n is lower, social security taxes τmust
rise for the viability of the pension program (SS). Higher taxes translate into lower
savings (the KK curve shifts further to the left) and lower demand for children (the
11Intuitively, the government cannot ﬁnance too high a replacement rate and still satisfy its
budget constraint. As shown in the proof of Lemma A.1, uniqueness of the steady state is not always
guaranteed. In case multiple equilibria exist, the comparative statics discussed in this section apply to
the one with the lowest contribution rate.
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NN curve shifts further to the left). A feedback loop between endogenous taxes and
fertility emerges: higher taxes lowers fertility, and a lower rate of fertility in turn
feeds back onto raising taxes further (to keep the pension program sustainable)—
and so on and so forth. This feedback loop from higher taxes to lower fertility
ampliﬁes the initial drop in fertility.
Figure 2 illustrates how the steady-state changes when moving from laissez-
faire (σ ¼ 0) to a target replacement rate of σ ¼ 30% , for two different
calibrations of the model. In the absence of intrafamily support (ψ0→0 and v>0),
Figure 2. From Laissez-Faire to PAYGO
Notes: Low v and high ψ0. Solid lines are for the Laissez-Faire (σ= τ= 0) and dashed lines for
PAYGO with σ ¼ 30 percent. Parameters values: β= 0.99 (annual basis), gA−1= 4.5 percent (annual
basis), v= 1 percent, θ= 1 percent, α= 30 percent, ϕ= 8 percent, ψ0= 20 percent, ψσ ¼ ψ0:e - 0:5σ; High v
and low ψ0. Solid lines are for the Laissez-Faire (σ= τ= 0) and dashed lines for PAYGO with
σ ¼ 30percent. Parameters values: β= 0.99 (annual basis), gA−1= 4.5 percent (annual basis), v= 15
percent, θ= 1 percent, α= 30 percent, ϕ= 8 percent, ψ0= 2 percent, ψσ ¼ ψ0:e - 0:5σ.
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the NN curve is almost vertical and fertility adjusts very little to a rise in the
replacement rate (bottom panel). In that case, a higher replacement rate increases
the interest rate. In the opposite case where intrafamily transfers are important, the
NN curve is almost horizontal and fertility adjusts much more (top panel). This
leads to a larger increase in contribution rates to ﬁnance the pensions. The shift of
the NN curve is ampliﬁed if a higher replacement rate crowds out intrafamily
transfers more (that is, when |Ψ′(.)| is higher). Thus, contrary to a standard model
where children are “consumption goods,” our theory incorporating intrafamily
support can generate large changes in fertility and contribution rates when
expanding the social security system. Interestingly, more generous pension
beneﬁts can cause the interest rate to fall when intrafamily transfers are important
(as seen in the top panel).
Productivity Growth and Social Security Adjustments
In sharp contrast to the laissez-faire case, fertility is not independent of productivity
growth gA under PAYGO. For a ﬁxed replacement rate σ, a fall in productivity
growth requires an increase in the contribution rate τ to balance the budget—thus
lowering disposable income, consumption and hence the demand for children. The
fall in fertility forces the government to raise taxes further—inducing a further drop
in fertility. The long-run equilibrium is the outcome of this feedback loop between
falling fertility and rising taxes. The interest rate will be lower under slower
productivity growth, as a result of the fall in the marginal product of capital, and
even more so when intrafamily transfers are important. The reason is that the
reduction in fertility exerts upward pressure on savings (net of investment) and
thereby pushes down the interest rate further. Most importantly, the impact of a fall
in productivity growth on fertility will be magniﬁed if intrafamily support is
important as lower growth reduces the beneﬁts from children.
Financial Liberalization and Social Security Adjustments
Domestic ﬁnancial liberalization can be interpreted in our framework as a
relaxation of credit constraints (that is, a rise in θ). The long-run implications of
such reforms for fertility and contribution rates are qualitatively similar to the ones
induced by a rise in the replacement ratio. A rise in θ lowers savings—the KK curve
shifts upward and fertility falls along the NN curve. Moreover, it also lowers
disposable income and middle-aged consumption, causing the NN curve shift to the
left, depressing fertility even further. In order to maintain a ﬁxed replacement rate
σ, taxes have to rise, feeding back onto lower fertility—and so on and so forth.
Moreover, the ﬂatter the NN curve (that is, intrafamily support is important), the
larger will be the drop in fertility caused by domestic ﬁnancial liberalization.
PAYGO in a Small Open Economy
We now brieﬂy examine the situation in which the country is a small open
economy, taking the world interest rate as given. Although this assumption is
arguably questionable in the case of China, it is useful to build intuition regarding
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some key differences between an economy under autarky and one that is integrated
globally. The small open economy example corresponds to the limiting case where
the interest rate does not adjust at all. Analyzing this polar case is also helpful to
understand the dynamics of fertility and taxes following ﬁnancial integration.
The dynamics of the model for a small open economy (SOE) are characterized
by Equations (4) and (11), with the capital-effective-labor ratio kt determined by
the world interest rate in every period. In the steady state, the KK curve is
horizontal, at the level of the world interest rate R*. Under PAYGO (b= 0) and for
a ﬁxed replacement rate σ, the equilibrium fertility and contribution rate ðnσ; τσÞ
must satisfy
nσgAψσ + λσ
nσϕ - λ 1 - τσ - θ -ψσð Þ
¼ R; (NN)
τσ ¼ σnσgA : (SS)
Comparative Statics
In the high ψ0 case, where a rise in the replacement ratio leads to a fall in interest
rate in the autarky steady state (top panel of Figure 2), the impact on fertility of an
increase in σ is stronger in the SOE scenario than in a closed economy. Under
ﬁnancial integration, the KK curve is horizontal: any shift to the left of the NN
curve due to higher taxes generates a larger fall of fertility as interest rates do not
adjust downward. Thus, if family transfers are important (high ψ0), a rise in social
security beneﬁts will lead to a higher tax rise under ﬁnancial integration. Fertility
also reacts more to a fall in productivity growth rate gA in an open economy. The
reason is that in a closed-economy setting, the fall in fertility due to lower growth is
dampened by a fall in the interest rate. When this dampening effect is shut off,
fertility falls by more and is thus matched by a greater increase in taxes to balance
the budget. The impact of a productivity slowdown on fertility is also magniﬁed
when intrafamily transfers are important.
III. Application: Policy Reforms in China
We next examine the dynamic impact of important policy reforms and economic
development in China, with a focus on pending fertility policies and pension
reforms. As our theoretical analysis has demonstrated that capital market reforms
and an eventual growth slowdown interact with the social security system, we also
take these highly relevant scenarios into consideration. Before turning to the
experiments, we ﬁrst provide more details on the main pillars of the recent reform
package in China.
The Chinese Context
As of 2005, most of the Chinese population is not covered by social security—
notwithstanding an early pension reform in the late 1990s (see Song and Yang,
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2012 and Dunaway and Arora, 2007). In urban areas, 48 percent of employees are
covered in 2005 (Dunaway and Arora, 2007) and coverage is highly concentrated
among workers at state and collectively owned enterprises—who account for a
diminishing share of total employment. Most of the fast-growing private sector
workforce, including China’s population of rural migrants, remains uncovered. In
the countryside, where old-age poverty is most severe, formal retirement protection
is virtually nonexistent. Rural workers are categorically excluded from the basic
pension system.12 Over the past few years, a series of government reform initiatives
were launched to push China’s retirement system to extend coverage nation-wide.
The government has stepped up efforts to broaden participation in the basic
pension system beyond its original base among workers at state and collectively
owned enterprises—and has set a goal of achieving universal coverage by 2020.
This expansion is under way, though far from reaching the end goal.
Traditionally, in the absence of social security, children supported parents in
old age. Not only is intergenerational support a social convention and a family
institutional norm, it is also stipulated by Constitutional law: “children who
have come of age have the duty to support and assist their parents” (article 49).
The importance of intergenerational transfers is fully borne out by the data (see
a more detailed description in Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin, 2014 and Cai
and others, 2012). According to the Chinese census data in 2005, family support
is on average the main source of income for the elderly (65+) population. It is
twice as large as pension income and wealth income combined. The ongoing
pension reform aims at replacing traditional family support, which is under
pressure following the implementation of the one-child policy in the early
1980s.13 The drastic reduction in fertility means that the previous generation of
parents are able to rely less on children’s support for their retirement. However,
the rapid aging of the Chinese population also hinders the plan to expand the
pension system.
Recently, the Third Plenum reform package was announced in November
2013. One of the main pillars was the relaxation of the one-child policy. As a ﬁrst
step, it stipulated that couples in which one member is an only child are allowed to
have two children. This rule applies to most of the urban couples currently planning
to have children. A second main pillar pertained to ﬁnancial market reforms. This
included accelerated capital account liberalization, and domestic interest rate
liberalization. Indeed, despite the rapid economic development in the last few
decades, China has seen far slower ﬁnancial development. For instance, even with
recent developments of the mortgage markets in the late 1990s, household debt and
mortgage debt (as a share of GDP) are still remarkably low—amounting to only 12
and 11 percent of GDP in 2008, respectively, about 1/8 of the levels observed in the
12In 2005, only 4.7 percent of the elderly’s income came from pension in rural areas. This is in
contrast to the 45.4 percent in urban areas, with a large heterogeneity among urban workers (Cai and
others, 2012).
13The one-child policy is strictly enforced in urban areas and less so in rural areas. According to
UHS data, 96 percent of all urban households who had children had one child. The urban fertility rate
fell from a bit above 3 in 1970 to close to 1 by 1982.
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United States.14 These imminent reforms—spanning from fertility policies,
pension reforms, to ﬁnancial market development—along with a likely growth
slowdown—are particularly important in the context of China. Given their impact
on social security, we conduct in what follows a comprehensive analysis of their
joint impact in the most likely of circumstances.
Steady State and Calibration
In the policy experiments that follow, the economy always starts from a well-
deﬁned initial steady state under endogenous fertility. The calibration of the initial
steady state under autarky is summarized in Table 2, along with values for the
Table 2. Benchmark Calibration: Structural Parameters and Steady-State Values
Parameter
Calibrated
Value Target/Description/Data Source
Benchmark
Calibration
β 0.99 Annual basis
α 30% Capital share
gA−1 4.5% Annual basis. Productivity growth rate (1980–2010)
θ 1% Saving rate of the 20–25 (UHS)
v 0.136 Targeted to match the fertility rate of 3 in 1970 (Census)
ϕ 8% Average education expenditures over income (UHS)
ψ0 10% Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin (2014), Curtis, Lugauer, and
Mark (2011)
ω 0.7 Elasticity of transfers to elderly w.r.t the nb. of siblings (CHARLS)
δ 0.3 Semielasticity of transfers to elderly w.r.t replacement rate
σ 30% Aggregate initial replacement ratio adjusted for coverage (UHS)
b 0 PAYGO simulation
Alternative Calibration (without family transfers toward elderly)
ψ0 0.1%
v 0.20 Targeted to match the fertility rate of 3 in 1970 (Census)
Autarky Steady State under Benchmark Calibration
nσ 1.50 Fertility of 3
Rσ - 1 9.12% Annual basis
τσ 7.27%
World Interest Rate under Financial Integration
R*−1 10% Annual basis. Based on a reasonable calibration for the United
States
14In 2008, U.S. household debt as a share of GDP (resp. mortgage debt as a share of GDP) is 95
percent (resp. 86 percent). Data on household debt are taken from McKinsey Global Institute and
Federal Reserve. Mortgage debt data come from Hypostat (2010) and the Chinese National Bureau of
Statistics.
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structural parameters. The initial period corresponds to 1970, just prior to the
implementation of fertility policies in China. Although our exercise is not meant
to be quantitative, structural parameters are calibrated using reasonable values
based on household micro data (Urban Household Survey (UHS) for income
and consumption data and China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study
(CHARLS) for data on family transfers; see Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin
(2014) for a detailed description of the data). We focus on urban households for
our calibration because data are mostly available for urban workers and because
fertility policies have been essentially binding in urban areas. However, note
that implementing social security in rural areas would require an even larger
adjustment in contributions since rural workers are currently barely covered by the
pension system.
Technology
One period corresponds to a generation, approximately 23 years. We set the capital
share to a standard value of 0.3. The growth rate of labor augmenting productivity
is set to 4.5 percent on an annual basis, the average in China over the last 30 years.
Capital Market Frictions
Our model features two types of ﬁnancial frictions: (1) credit constraints and (2)
capital controls (ﬁnancial autarky). Initial credit constraints need to be quite
stringent in order to account for the very low level of household debt in China
until 2000 (only 4 percent of GDP in 2000) and the very low level of borrowing by
young households in the early 1990s. A value of θ= 1 percent allows us to match
the saving rate of individuals under 25, as observed in UHS data in 1992 (see
Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and Jin, 2014). This low initial value of θ contributes to
depress the interest rate in the autarky steady state. In our benchmark experiments,
we assume that China remains under ﬁnancial autarky throughout, but we also
perform experiments where China lifts its capital controls (“ﬁnancial integration”).
In the latter scenario, we assume that the exogenous world interest rate R* is
slightly above the interest rate prevailing in the Chinese autarky steady state—an
assumption based on the observed direction of capital ﬂows from China to the rest
of the world over the last 20 years.15 The world interest rate faced by China under
ﬁnancial integration is chosen to be 10 percent (on an annual basis)—which
corresponds to a realistic calibration of the model for a ﬁnancially developed
market, such as the United States.
Intergenerational Transfers
The replacement rate σ in the initial steady state is set to 30 percent, which roughly
corresponds to the aggregate urban replacement rate in China in the late 1990s,
once adjusting for the extent of social security coverage.16 Transfers received by
15In reality, since the early 1990s, China stands in between ﬁnancial autarky and complete
ﬁnancial integration, but our framework is not suitable to accommodate partial integration.
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elderly parents from their nt children in period t+2 are assumed to have the
functional form
To;t + 2 ¼ Ψ σt + 2ð Þ n
ϖ
t
ϖ
 
wm;t + 2  ψ0e - δσt + 2
nϖt
ϖ
 
wm;t + 2;
where ψ0 measures the overall degree of ascending altruism in China, δ measures
the strength of the crowding-out effect from social security beneﬁts on intrafamily
transfers, and 1−ϖ measures the intensity of free-riding among siblings in
providing support to their parents. Using data on transfers toward parents from
the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), Choukhmane,
Coeurdacier, and Jin (2014) ﬁnd that the elasticity of transfers by middle-aged
individuals to their parents with respect to the number of siblings (which
corresponds to ϖ−1) is between −0.3 and −0.4, leading us to set ϖ= 0.7. Direct
empirical measures of δ are not available, and thus we perform sensitivity analysis
with respect to this parameter in section “Sensitivity Analysis and Discussion.” In
our benchmark calibration, we set δ= 0.3—that is, a 10-percentage-point increase
in the replacement rate would cause ascending intrafamily transfers to drop by
about 3 percent.17 Given ϖ, δ, and σ, the ascending altruism parameter ψ0 is set to
10 percent: a middle-aged individual with two siblings transfers about 11 percent of
his wage income to his parents, in the ballpark of estimates from micro data (see
Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin, 2014; Curtis, Lugauer, and Mark, 2011).18
Finally, based on the Urban Household Survey, transfers to children for education
purposes amount to about 8 percent of household income; therefore, ϕ is set to 8
percent (see Banerjee and others (2013) for a similar value).
Preferences
We set β= 0.99 on an annual basis. The parameter v, which governs the preference
for children, is set to 0.136 in order match the fertility rate in China before the
implementation of fertility controls (roughly 3 children per household in 1970). In
16Song and Yang (2012) document a replacement rate of about 60–70 percent in state-owned
enterprises, covering 44 percent of the urban population in 1992. In the late 1990s, at the time of the
ﬁrst pension reform, the Chinese Statistical Yearbook gives an aggregate replacement (adjusted for
coverage) slightly above 30 percent, while UHS data give a number close to 25 percent in 2002. Note
that including rural areas would lower our initial replacement rate: any reform to increase beneﬁts/
coverage would require an even larger rise in contributions to sustain the pension system.
17Cai, Giles, and Meng (2006) provide an indirect measure of δ for China. In the cross section,
they ﬁnd that when elderly income (before family transfer) increases by 1 yuan, support from children
falls by 0.25 yuan (see also Chapter 3 in Cai and others (2012) and Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004)
for similar evidence in the context of the Philippines). Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004) also provide
evidence that the presence of retirement beneﬁts crowds out ascending transfers from children.
18Data on pecuniary transfers from CHARLS would imply a lower ψ0, around 5–6 percent as
many transfers toward elderly, such as co-residence or health care, are non-pecuniary. Restricting our
attention to children that are not living with their parents, we ﬁnd that they transfer about 10 percent
of their wage income, in line with our calibration. Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin (2014) also
show that transfers have to be an order of magnitude larger than observed pecuniary ones to match
age-saving proﬁles in China.
FERTILITY POLICIES AND SOCIAL SECURITY REFORMS IN CHINA
391
the corresponding initial steady state, the contribution rate τσ necessary to ﬁnance
the social security system under PAYGO (b= 0 and σ ¼ 0:3) is equal to 7.3
percent.19
Alternative Calibration
In order to illustrate the role of ascending intrafamily transfers, we run some of the
experiments under an alternative calibration, in which we set ψ0= 0.1 percent, and
adjust the preference for children v accordingly to generate the same fertility rate in
the initial steady state—yielding v= 0.20. Relative to the benchmark calibration,
this corresponds to a situation where children are more like consumption goods
than investment goods.
In the policy experiments that follow, we perform numerical simulations
assuming that the government targets a certain path of social security beneﬁts {σt}.
The objective is to assess how the economy would adjust to shocks if the
generosity of the existing system is increased (or at least maintained). The model
dynamics are governed by Equations (4), (11) and (12). For most experiments we
make the PAYGO assumption, bt= 0. Robustness checks with respect to model
parameters and other social security schemes (trust fund) are relegated to section
“Sensitivity Analysis and Discussion.”
Fertility and Social Security Policies
We focus ﬁrst on the two main pending reforms on the policy agenda in China: (1)
the relaxation of the one-child policy and (2) the increase in social security beneﬁts.
The One-Child Policy and its Relaxation
We ﬁrst investigate the dynamics of the model as the government relaxes the one-
child policy for the coming generations of parents. The economy starts off at t= 1
(1970) from its autarkic steady state with endogenous fertility. We assume that
fertility is constrained to one child per household for one generation in period t= 2
(corresponding to the mid-1990s), and then fully relaxed at t= 3 (that is, in the very
near future). Figure 3 displays the dynamics of the interest rate, fertility, and taxes.
The one-child policy leads to a large rise in savings (net of investment) and a
required tax hike in t= 4 when the one-child generation becomes the main
contributor to social security. The large rise in savings occasions a large fall in the
interest rate, followed by a gradual rise—as the fertility constraint is relaxed.
Required tax hikes are large and long-lasting, as fertility is persistently below
steady state after the relaxation of the policy (in period t= 4, fertility is around 2.5
for a tax rate of 15 percent). These results derive from two feedback loops. As per
children being consumption goods—higher tax rates feed into lower consumption
and lower fertility—and thus back onto higher taxes. As per children being
investment goods—the relaxation of the policy increases interest rates by raising
19This is comparable with the current 13 percent payroll tax paid by employers given that about
half of the urban population is covered.
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the marginal productivity of capital, hence restricting the rise in fertility. Without
this latter feedback effect, fertility reverts faster to its steady state—as shown in the
alternative calibration in which intrafamily transfers toward the elderly are absent.
A Rise in the Replacement Ratio
In addition to relaxing the one-child policy, China is currently expanding the
coverage of its social security system. Although the government’s objective is to
attain full coverage, the corresponding targeted replacement rate, intended to be
lower than the current one, is difﬁcult to assess. We assume that all urban workers
will be covered under the reformed system (thus doubling the coverage), at a
replacement rate of about 15–20 percentage points below its current level.20 This
reform is tantamount to a rise in the aggregate replacement ratio in our model. The
experiment we analyze involves a rise in σ from its initial value of 30–50 percent at
t= 3, which coincides with the period when the one-child policy is relaxed. Results
for the combination of these two policies are shown in Figure 4 and constitute our
benchmark experiment.
Figure 3. The One-Child Policy and its Relaxation
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Notes: The solid (resp. dashed) line corresponds to the benchmark (resp. alternative) calibration.
Parameters values are shown in Table 2. The one-child policy is implemented at t= 2 and relaxed at t= 3.
20This is consistent with the early pension reforms of the late 1990s. Starting at very high level
for covered workers, the replacement ratio recently fell in China by 10-15 percent depending on the
region/sector, while coverage has been increasing—such that overall Chinese households are better
insured for their old age (see ISSA Report, 2013). Estimates of the World Bank suggest to set a
replacement rate of 40 percent for the sustainability of the system (see Sin, 2005) while the early
pension reforms are targeting 60 percent.
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Although the relaxation of fertility constraints may help alleviate the
ﬁscal pressure brought about by the one-child policy, our simulations show
that fertility remains permanently lower after the social security reforms—
and particularly so if intrafamily transfers are important. Fertility is around 2
at t= 4 in our benchmark calibration (and only 2.4 one generation after)
compared with more than 2.5 at t= 4 (and 2.9 at t= 5) in the alternative
calibration.
On top of the effects caused by the one-child policy, a rise in replacement
rates triggers a rise in interest rates which reduces fertility. Fertility is therefore
particularly depressed if intrafamily transfers are important—since it becomes
more sensitive to the rise in interest rates. Moreover, the rise in replacement
rates crowds out intrafamily transfers, depressing further fertility. Finally, taxes
must rise to stabilize the government budget as replacement rates are higher and
fertility lower. The required tax hike exerts additional continual downward
pressure on fertility. In the long term, as the only-child generation goes into
retirement, taxes fall but remain persistently higher (taxes increase to roughly
27 percent at t= 4 and stay close to 20 percent one generation after, well above
the initial steady state). In sum, despite the relaxation of the one-child policy,
taxes remain very high and fertility permanently depressed. This dynamic
effects of the policy reform would be absent in a model with exogenous fertility
(or largely mitigated in a model without intrafamily support).
Figure 4. Benchmark Experiment: Relaxation of the OCP and a Rise in the
Replacement Ratio
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Notes: The solid (resp. dashed) line corresponds to the benchmark (resp. alternative) calibration.
Parameters values are shown in Table 2. The one-child policy is implemented at t= 2 and relaxed at t= 3.
The replacement ratio is increased permanently at t= 3 from σ ¼ 30 percent to σ ¼ 50 percent.
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We are interested in the dynamic effects of reforms following the one-child
policy while the government is at the same time trying to raise social security
beneﬁts. Thus, unless stated otherwise, all subsequent simulations include the
shocks to fertility (at t= 2) and the increase in the replacement rate (at t= 3)—as in
our benchmark experiment.
Capital Market Reforms
We now investigate how other plausible policy reforms in China interact with
social security policy and the relaxation of the one-child policy. In particular, two
reforms of the capital markets are of particular relevance: (1) ﬁnancial liberalization
within China and (2) ﬁnancial integration with the rest of the world. For these
simulations, the benchmark calibration is considered. For comparison purposes,
also shown is the path of variables without these additional reforms (benchmark
experiment).
Financial Liberalization
In our framework, domestic ﬁnancial liberalization can be understood qualitatively
as a rise in θ. It can also be more broadly interpreted as any reform that aims to raise
Figure 5. Domestic Financial Liberalization
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Notes: The dashed (resp. solid) line corresponds to the experiment with domestic ﬁnancial
liberalization (resp. the benchmark experiment without ﬁnancial liberalization). Parameters values are
shown in Table 2. The one-child policy is implemented at t= 2 and relaxed at t= 3. The replacement ratio is
increased permanently at t= 3 from σ ¼ 30 percent to σ ¼ 50 percent. Domestic ﬁnancial liberalization (a
rise of θ to 10 percent) occurs at t= 3.
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the latently repressed interest rate.21 The experiment we analyze consists of
increasing θ from its initial value of 1 to 10 percent at t= 3 (when the one-child
policy is relaxed and social security reforms are implemented).22 Results are shown
in Figure 5.
Compared with the benchmark experiment without ﬁnancial liberalization,
fertility is further depressed (below 2 at t= 4 and t= 5) and taxes persistently
higher. As the rise in θ lowers savings and exerts upward pressure on the
interest rate, the rise in fertility is further contained after the relaxation of the
one-child policy. This requires the government to set higher taxes to sustain its
pension reform, depressing fertility further (and so on and so forth).23 Thus, the
policy reforms face an important trade-off: the persistence of the one-child
policy shock makes the government’s intentions to liberalize its ﬁnancial
markets and implement its pension reforms potentially problematic. Note that
such a trade-off would be absent in a model with exogenous fertility (and
largely mitigated in a model where intrafamily transfers toward old-age are
unimportant).24
Financial Integration
In our framework, ﬁnancial integration can be understood as China lifting its
capital controls, so that the return to capital faced by domestic households and the
world interest rate are equalized (Small Open Economy case). We assume that
when liberalizing its capital account at t= 3, China opens up to a world with a
higher interest rate R*= 10 percent on an annual basis. Results of the simulation
under the benchmark calibration are shown in Figure 6, together with the autarky
paths in our benchmark experiment.
We observe ﬁrst that the rise in interest rates following integration triggers a
fall in fertility (and higher taxes). Second, the mechanism that tends to ease
social security pressure under autarky—whereby lower interest rates feed into
higher fertility—is now absent. Fertility is therefore even lower in an open
economy, which implies substantially larger tax rates (at t= 4, taxes reach
almost 40 percent). The impact of the one-child policy shock, together with an
increase in pension coverage, is signiﬁcantly more costly if capital controls are
21Our ﬁnancial friction depresses interest rates and drives a wedge between the frictionless
interest rate and the equilibrium one. This is qualitatively equivalent to a price distortion due to
regulated interest rates. A difference though is that our friction does not generate budget surplus for
the government. This implies that, unlike our experiment, a fall in price distortions (interest rate
liberalization) would be even more harmful for the government’s budget.
22Strictly speaking, such a reform implies that households are allowed to borrow 10 times more.
Such a shock can appear large but note that over the period 2000–10, household debt (as a share of
GDP) in China was multiplied by 3 following, in particular, the mortgage reform in the late 1990s.
See Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and Jin (2014).
23Note that the equilibrium interest rate is almost unaffected by ﬁnancial liberalization, despite
the relaxation of credit constraints, due to the countervailing effect of lower fertility and higher taxes.
24In our alternative calibration, fertility reverts back much faster and is less affected by the
ﬁnancial liberalization (not shown). This is so because family-transfers are essential to make fertility
interest rate sensitive.
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lifted.25 Thus, China faces another policy trade-off: opening up capital markets
will exert pressure on the sustainability of the PAYGO system that the govern-
ment wishes to expand.
Alternative Growth Scenarios
Growth has been remarkably high in China over the last 30 years, facilitating the
recent expansion of social security coverage. Yet a growth slowdown is a likely
scenario. We now examine the impact of the main policy experiments against the
background of a permanent growth slowdown.
A Permanent Slowdown in Growth
Our next simulation superimposes on the benchmark experiment a permanent fall
in productivity growth from an annual rate of 4.5 to 2.5 percent (occurring at t= 3).
Results are displayed in Figure 7. The path from the benchmark experiment
(without growth slowdown) is shown for comparison purposes.
Compared with the benchmark case, the fall in the growth rate leads
to a permanently lower fertility rate and interest rate. As a consequence,
Figure 6. Financial Integration
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Notes: The solid (resp. dashed) line corresponds to the experiment with ﬁnancial integration (resp. the
benchmark experiment without ﬁnancial integration). Parameters values are shown in Table 2. The one-
child policy is implemented at t= 2 and relaxed at t= 3. The replacement ratio is increased permanently at
t= 3 from σ ¼ 30 percent to σ ¼ 50 percent. Financial integration occurs at t= 3.
25Note that our ﬁndings constitute an upper-bound of the ﬁscal costs of ﬁnancial integration
since China, being a fairly large economy, would induce the world interest rate to adjust somewhat.
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higher taxes are required to balance the budget—in turn restraining the rise
in fertility ensuing the relaxation of the one-child policy. The combined effects of
aging (of the generation of the only child) and the fall in growth exerts a very high
pressure on the viability of the pension system—forcing taxes to rise progressively
from 19 percent at t= 3 to 42 percent at t= 5, before reverting slightly as the
generation of only child ages. Owing to the feedback loop from higher taxes to lower
fertility, fertility stays permanently depressed, signiﬁcantly below 2 at t= 4 and t= 5.
The predicament of these circumstances cast serious doubt on whether China is able
to pursue its pension reforms.
It is also important to note that the effects of growth are strongly ampliﬁed by the
presence of intrafamily transfers: lower growth implies a lower return from children
—thus depressing fertility. When running the same experiment under the alternative
calibration (with ψ0= 0.1 percent), we ﬁnd that fertility converges much more
rapidly (close to 2.2 at t= 3 and 2.5 at t= 4), as it is much less sensitive to growth.
This tends to place less pressure on the social security system.26
Figure 7. A Permanent Slowdown in Growth
1 2 3 4 5 6
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
Net interest rate (in %, annualized), deviation from initial steady state
Baseline Scenario
Growth Slowdown
1 2 3 4 5 6
1
2
3
Fertility (number of children per family)
1 2 4
10
20
30
40
Contribution rate (in %)
3 5 6
Notes: The dashed (resp. solid) line corresponds to the experiment with a permanent slowdown in
growth (resp. the benchmark experiment without a permanent slowdown in growth). Parameters values are
shown in Table 2. The one-child policy is implemented at t= 2 and relaxed at t= 3. The replacement ratio is
increased permanently at t= 3 from σ ¼ 30 percent to σ ¼ 50 percent. At t= 3, productivity growth falls
permanently from 4.5 to 2.5 percent.
26The key parameter determining the response of fertility to a change in growth over the interest
rate (gA/R) is ψσ. When intrafamily transfers are important (high ψσ), a growth slowdown triggers a
larger fall in fertility.
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Capital Market Reforms in the Event of a Growth Slowdown
We now investigate the dynamics of the model with domestic ﬁnancial liberal-
ization (resp. ﬁnancial integration), occurring at t= 3, when the economy
concurrently slows down.27 It turns out that the social security system with a high
replacement ratio of σ ¼ 50% is no longer sustainable and cannot be ﬁnanced.
The upward pressure on interest rates driven by capital markets reforms ampliﬁes
the fall in fertility, leading to an even larger rise in taxes, feeding back into even
lower fertility. The government ends up not being able to ﬁnance its increased
spending on social security, and the system collapses.28 The impact of a
permanently slower growth is thus very costly for social security sustainability if
the government simultaneously liberalizes ﬁnancial markets.
This implies that the Chinese government can face a serious tension between
expanding the generosity of the existing pension system and deepening its capital
markets. Even maintaining the current social security program becomes difﬁcult: if
the replacement ratio remains at its initial value of 30 percent (Figure 8), there is
still strong downward pressure on fertility and upward pressure on taxes—in both
cases of domestic ﬁnancial liberalization (solid line), or lifting capital controls
(dashed line). Financial integration presents greater challenges since the
counteracting effect of a fall in interest rates is absent in the open economy and
thus the drop in fertility is larger.29
Extending the analysis under ﬁnancial integration to a large open economy
model would imply considerable international consequences: the world interest
rate could be persistently depressed under this scenario—due to low growth, high
taxes, and low fertility in China.
Sensitivity Analysis and Discussion
Alternative Social Security Schemes
We investigate how our results depend on the social security scheme under
consideration. An alternative scenario moving away from a PAYGO system is the
presence of a trust fund, whereby a government accumulates positive assets
(b>0) to smooth negative demographic (or productivity) shocks over time, by
partly selling its stock of assets. We assume that the government in China
starts out initially without assets but increases contribution taxes of the current
generation of middle-aged and accumulates assets up to b= 3.7 percent at t=
3—before the generation of only children ages. Such a value for b allows the
government to share the tax burden between the current and future generation of
27Domestic ﬁnancial liberalization is modeled as before—a rise in θ from its initial value of 1 to
10 percent.
28This echoes Lemma A.1 which states that social security is sustainable up to certain threshold
in the replacement rate. Again, intrafamily transfers are essential for this result; such a bankruptcy of
the social security system does not happen in the alternative calibration.
29Alternatively, one can calculate the maximum replacement ratio that China can implement
under such a growth scenario while implementing domestic ﬁnancial liberalization (resp. ﬁnancial
integration); we ﬁnd σ very close to 45 percent in both cases.
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workers just about equally.30 The government is then assumed to exhaust its trust
fund in two generations, reaching b= 0 at t= 6.
To build intuition, it is helpful to consider the impact of the existence of the
trust fund on the autarky steady state. With a higher b, the interest rate is lower (KK
shifts upward) and the fertility rate higher; conversely, reducing the size of the trust
fund raises the interest rate and lowers fertility in the steady state. Thus, when
building a trust fund to smooth the shocks, the government increases taxes for the
current generation of workers but fertility will be higher (and taxes lower) for the
coming generations. This is illustrated in Figure 9 together with the benchmark
experiment (PAYGO): tax contributions increases signiﬁcantly for the current
generation but less so at t= 4, reaching 17.5 percent (compared with 27 percent in
our benchmark experimentation). As a consequence, fertility catches up faster and
stays persistently higher. Similar ﬁndings hold under an experiment involving a
permanent growth slowdown.
Figure 8. Capital Markets Reforms in the Event of a Growth Slowdown (Without
Pension Reforms)
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Notes: The solid (resp. dashed) line corresponds to the experiment with a permanent slowdown in
growth and domestic ﬁnancial liberalization, that is, a rise of θ to 10 percent (resp. the experiment with a
permanent slowdown in growth and ﬁnancial integration). Parameters values are shown in Table 2. The
one-child policy is implemented at t= 2 and relaxed at t= 3. The replacement ratio is kept constant
throughout at σ ¼ 30 percent. Domestic ﬁnancial liberalization (resp. ﬁnancial integration) occurs at t= 3.
At t= 3, productivity growth falls permanently from 4.5 to 2.5 percent.
30In our model, b is a small share of GDP due to a low capital output ratio in a model with full
depreciation and three periods only while still corresponding to a signiﬁcant share of the total capital
stock.
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If the government undergoes capital market reforms in the presence of a trust
fund, the costs of these reforms are also mitigated. If the government accumulates a
fund, any increase in the interest rate (due to domestic ﬁnancial liberalization or
ﬁnancial integration) will tend to relax its budget constraint. Capital markets reforms
are thus less costly for the government. A similar simulation (not shown) where the
government accumulates b>0 at t= 3 shows that taxes are lower in the subsequent
periods under ﬁnancial integration than under autarky (and barely increasing
following ﬁnancial liberalization): the fall in revenues due to the induced drop in
fertility is more than compensated by an increase resulting from the higher return on
government assets. The feedback loop from higher taxes to lower fertility is thus not
in operation, and fertility is higher under ﬁnancial integration. Taxes (resp. fertility)
can also stay at a persistently lower (resp. higher) level than in autarky by running
down the trust fund at a slow pace as long as foreign returns are high. This
experiment demonstrates that the negative effects of ﬁnancial integration (and to
a lesser extent domestic ﬁnancial liberalization) can be signiﬁcantly alleviated if the
government can accumulate a trust fund by taxing the current generation.
Sensitivity Analysis
We investigate the sensitivity of our results to parameters δ and ϕ, both of which
affect private transfers. The parameter δ measures the intensity of the crowding out
Figure 9. Tax Smoothing with a Trust Fund
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Notes: Structural parameters are shown in Table 2. The one-child policy is implemented at t= 2 and
relaxed at t= 3. The replacement ratio is increased permanently at t= 3 from σ ¼ 30 percent to
σ ¼ 50 percent. In the trust fund scenario (dashed line), China starts at b= 0 but accumulate assets b= 3.7
percent at t= 3 before running down the fund such that b= 0.75 percent at t= 4, 0.25 percent at t= 5 before
reaching 0 at t= 6. The benchmark experiment (solid line) corresponds to b= 0 throughout.
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of social security on family transfers. We replicate our benchmark experiment with
δ= 0 and with δ= 0.6. Differences with our benchmark simulation are very
moderate. With δ= 0, fertility is about 0.1 higher all along the transition compared
with a simulation with δ= 0.6. Respectively, taxes are at most 1 percent higher in
the latter calibration. Increasing δ has ambiguous effects in our model: on the one
hand, a higher δ makes fertility more responsive to an increase in the replacement
rate (crowding out effect); on the other, it also increases savings, lowering the
interest rate, and thus raises fertility. For our benchmark calibration, δ exerts little
effect on the dynamics of the model.
The parameter ϕ measures the cost of raising kids as a fraction of wages and is
assumed to be constant over the whole period in our simulations. Recent trends in
China suggest that, since 2000, schooling costs and tuition fees have been rising at
a fast pace, particularly so in higher education (Dong and Wan, 2012).31 If this
trend were to continue, natural fertility might fall by even more than our
experiments predict. In a simulation of the model where ϕ is assumed to increase
by 25 percent at t= 3 (not shown), we ﬁnd that fertility is 0.4 below our benchmark
counterpart at t= 4, and taxes about 5 percent higher—amplifying signiﬁcantly our
ﬁndings.
Discussion and Caveats
The model is kept parsimonious in order to extract the importance of endogenous
fertility in impacting the economy subjected to various shocks—particularly in the
presence of intrafamily transfers. One could argue though that other margins
of adjustment, such as human capital accumulation, labor supply, rural-urban
migrations—to name a few, could attenuate some of these effects. We discuss some
of these extensions although an in-depth study is left for future studies.
Human Capital Accumulation If parents can substitute “quantity” for “qual-
ity”—by raising their only child’s human capital through education investment—
the rise in the ﬁnancing costs of the social security system as a result of the policy
can be mitigated to a degree. As Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin (2014) show,
the one-child policy shock tends to foster rapid human capital accumulation of the
only child. However, the argument can be reversed when the policy is relaxed and
the social security beneﬁts rise. In particular, increasing social security coverage
could depress the return on human capital investment by lowering expected
transfers from children—thus exacerbating the ﬁscal costs of the policy. The
interaction of fertility with social security—while incorporating human capital—is
left for further research.
Labor Supply Labor supply responses to various shocks could also mitigate the
difﬁculties in implementing the pension reform. In particular, a persistent fall in
31According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics (2012), the per capita higher
education tuition and fees continued to increase over time. Between 1997 and 2008, the per capita
tuition and fees steadily increased with an average annual growth rate of 14.4 percent.
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fertility could potentially lead to an increase in labor market participation—
especially for women—though this effect is not found to be very signiﬁcant (see
He and Zhu, 2013). Older people might also remain active for longer in response to
a fall in support from children at retirement. Cai and others (2012) show that this is
particularly relevant for rural areas, because the lack of social safety nets compels
individuals in their sixties to rely still heavily on their labor income. In urban areas,
according to UHS data, labor income is a negligible fraction of income for
individuals above 60, and retirement ages are strictly observed. Conversely, a rise
in replacement rates might trigger a fall in labor market participation of older
workers, and thus the overall impact of policy reforms in China on aggregate labor
supply remains unclear.
Rural and Urban Migrations Our framework does not allow for a dual economy
with a rural-urban divide, although it would be a natural extension for the case of
China. Without harmonization in pension entitlements between rural and urban
areas, high migration rates toward cities would help advance the reform in urban
areas by increasing the urban working population and contributions (Song and
others, 2013). Naturally, the more universal is the reform, the less helpful internal
migrations are. However, a more universal reform might also change incentives for
migrations, which might interact with its ﬁnancing. One particular feature of the
current pension system is that most rural migrants (non-hukou migrants) are
excluded from social security. As the intended reforms plan to remedy this issue,
the beneﬁts of migration may become higher and labor supply in cities further
boosted. The fact that urban areas pay higher wages means that the required tax
adjustment may be smaller. The quantitative importance of such feedback effects
remains to be established—particularly in China where migrations are subject to
heavy administrative regulations.
IV. Conclusion
The Chinese government has ambitious plans to expand its social security system
to reach full national coverage. But its recent decision to relax its prolonged one-
child policy may not be as helpful in this process as one would expect. In a
framework with endogenous fertility where notions of intergenerational support
within families are strong, we show that an expansion of social security access/
beneﬁts exerts downward pressure on desired fertility—and in turn, offsets some of
the positive effect that abandoning the one-child policy has on fertility. This
countervailing force is stronger the more important are intrafamily transfers in an
economy.
Moreover, the government may face implicit policy tradeoffs. Seemingly
disparate policy reforms, such as capital market reforms and the pension reform can
in fact interact, and in such a way that makes carrying out the social security
expansion particularly difﬁcult—in spite of relaxing fertility controls. The rise in
interest rates with ﬁnancial liberalization and ﬁnancial integration further depresses
fertility. Implementing the pension reforms thus becomes more costly—and even
more so if China experiences a growth slowdown. These negative effects of growth
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are ampliﬁed by the effects of intergenerational transfers. And in plausible
circumstances, the social security reform may be entirely infeasible if the
government also chooses to reform its domestic capital market at the same time.
The realistic importance of these feedback loops arising from the interlinkages
between interest rates, fertility, and social security can only be illuminated by a
more in-depth quantitative investigation that our stylized model is not fully
equipped to undertake. But what our analyses show is that allowing for
endogenous fertility responses may be key, particularly in the context of pension
reforms. Predictions of the magnitude and the dynamics of the requisite ﬁscal
adjustments for expanding social security are very different in models with
exogenous fertility. These adjustments also seem to be distinct in economies in
which children are more akin to “consumption goods” compared with economies in
which they are also “investment goods.”
International spillovers onto other economies—potentially very dissimilar in
terms of ﬁnancial development, pension systems, or the role of children—
constitute a natural and relevant extension to consider (as in Fehr, Jokisch, and
Kotlikoff, 2007 and Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante, 2007). As China is becoming
ever larger and more important in the world economy, its particular policy choices
and growth scenarios will undoubtedly have an important bearing on the world
economy.
APPENDIX
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Deﬁne
n  λ 1 - τ - θ -ψσ
ϕ
;
n  1 - τ - θ -ψσ
ϕ
+
1 + β
βð1 - αÞ b>n:
Note that RKK(n) is strictly positive and ﬁnite if and only if n<n, while RNN(n) is strictly positive
and ﬁnite if and only if n>n. Also note that
0< lim
n#n
RKKðnÞ< lim
n#n
RNNðnÞ ¼ 1;
0< lim
n"n
RNNðnÞ< lim
n"n
RKKðnÞ ¼ 1:
The steady state (R, n) is such that RKK(n)=RNN(n)=R. The KK and NN curves are increasing
and decreasing, respectively, guaranteeing that their intersection is unique. The equilibrium
fertility rate lies in ðn; nÞ, and R>0.
Lemma A.1 For any target replacement ratio σ that satisﬁes
σ<
1 - θ -ψσð Þ2gA
4ϕ
2λΘ + 2 λ + βð Þψσ + λ 1 + βð Þ 1 - θ -ψσð Þ
2Θ + 2 1 + βð Þψσ + 1 + βλð Þ 1 - θ -ψσð Þ
 
; (A.1)
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there exists a steady-state equilibrium under PAYGO. Moreover, if ð1 - λÞψσ<λΘ and if the
contribution rate is constrained to remain below τmaxσ  ð1 - θ -ψσÞ=ð2Þ, then the steady-state
equilibrium is unique.
Equation (A.1) provides implicity an upper bound for σ.
Proof of Lemma A.1: To start with, consider a PAYGO system at steady state with
contribution rate τ>0. Setting b= 0 and using Equation (15) to substitute σ= ngAτ in Equations
(13) and (14), we can solve for the equilibrium fertility and interest rate, each expressed as a
function of τ:
n τð Þ ¼ 1 - τ - θ -ψσð Þ
ϕ
λΘ + λ + βð Þψσ + λ 1 + βð Þτ
Θ + 1 + βð Þψσ + 1 + βλð Þτ
 
;
R τð Þ ¼ gA
βϕ
 
λΘ + λ + βð Þψσ + λ 1 + βð Þτ
1 - λ
 
:
Now suppose the government targets a replacement rate σ>0. The steady-state equilibrium
triplet ðnσ;Rσ; τσÞ must satisfy
nσ ¼ n τσð Þ; Rσ ¼ R τσð Þ; τσ ¼ σnσgA :
Noting that nσ ¼ ðσÞ=ðgAτσÞ, the equilibrium contribution rate τσ is pinned down by the
equation nðτσÞ ¼ σgAτσ, which can also be written FðτσÞ ¼ GðτσÞ, where
F τð Þ  τ 1 - τ - θ -ψσð Þ G τð Þ 
ϕσ
gA
Θ + 1 + βð Þψσ + 1 + βλð Þτ
λΘ + λ + βð Þψσ + λ 1 + βð Þτ
 
:
The function F is concave, starts at zero at τ= 0, initially increases to reach a maximum at
ð1 - θψσÞ=ð2Þ
F
1 - θ -ψσ
2
 
¼ 1 - θ -ψσð Þ
2
4
 Fmaxσ ;
and then decreases, crossing zero again at τ ¼ 1 - θ -ψσ. The function G is always strictly
positive. Moreover, differentiating G yields
G
0
τð Þ ¼ ϕσ
gA
β 1 - λð Þ 1 - λð Þψσ - λΘ½ 
λΘ + λ + βð Þψσ + λ 1 + βð Þτ½ 2
;
and
G
00
τð Þ ¼ - 2ϕσ
gA
λ 1 + βð Þβ 1 - λð Þ 1 - λð Þψσ - λΘ½ 
λΘ + λ + βð Þψσ + λ 1 + βð Þτ½ 3
:
Therefore G is strictly increasing and concave if ð1 - λÞψσ>λΘ, it is constant if ð1 - λÞψσ ¼ λΘ,
and it is strictly decreasing and convex if ð1 - λÞψσ<λΘ. In any of these conﬁgurations, a
sufﬁcient condition for the function F and G to cross at least once is Gðð1 - θ -ψσÞ=ð2ÞÞ≤Fmaxσ ,
which is equivalent to (A.1). This condition implicitly provides an upper bound on σ. When it is
satisﬁed, there exists at least one value of τ≤ð1 - θ -ψσÞ=ð2Þ such that F(τ)=G(τ). If moreover
ð1 - λÞψσ<λΘ, the intersection is unique, which pins down a unique equilibrium contribution
rate τσ<τmaxσ . In the case several equilibria exist, we focus on the one with the lowest
contribution rate. The equilibrium fertility and interest rate are determined by nσ ¼ nðτσÞ and
Rσ ¼ RðτσÞ:
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Proof of Proposition 2 From Lemma A.1, an equilibrium must satisfy:
ϕσΓ σð Þ
gAτσ
¼ 1 - τσ - θ -ψσð Þ (A.2)
with Γ σð Þ ¼ ðΘ +ψσð1 + βÞ + ð1 + βλÞτσÞ=ðλΘ +ψσðλ + βÞ + λð1 + βÞτσÞ. We know from Lemma
A.1, that there exists (at least) one solution and τσ≤ð1 - θ -ψσÞ=ð2Þ. Rewrite Γ(.) as follows:
Γ σð Þ ¼ 1 + 1 - λð ÞU σð Þ≥1
with U σð Þ ¼ ðΘ +ψσ + τσÞ=ðψσβ + λðΘ +ψσÞ + λð1 + βÞτσÞ. We denote ∂x ¼ ð∂xÞ=ð∂σÞ.
∂U σð Þ ¼ β ∂τσ 1 - λð Þψσ - λΘð Þ - ∂ψσ 1 - λð Þτσ +Θ½ 
ψσ β + λð Þ + λΘ + λ 1 + βð Þτσð Þ2
:
Let us distinguish two cases: U(.) increasing and U(.) potentially decreasing.
Case 1 1 - λð Þψσ≥λΘ:Then ∂U σð Þ>0 if ∂τσ>0 (as ∂ψσ≤0). Equation A.2 is equivalent to:
ϕnσ ¼ 1 - τσ -ψσ - θð Þ1 + 1 - λð ÞU σð Þ : (A.3)
Differentiating Equation A.3:
ϕ∂nσ ¼ - ∂ τσ +ψσð Þ1 + 1 - λð ÞU σð Þ - 1 - λð Þ∂U σð Þ
1 - τσ -ψσ - θð Þ
1 + 1 - λð ÞU σð Þð Þ2 : (A.4)
Note that the second term is strictly negative if ∂τσ>0 and thus ∂ τσ +ψσð Þ≥0 implies ∂nσ<0.
Differentiating A.2 leads to:
∂ τσ +ψσð Þ 1 - 2τσ -ψσ - θð Þ ¼ ∂ψσ 1 - τσ -ψσ - θð Þ +
ϕ
gA
1 + 1 - λð ÞU σð Þð Þ
+
ϕ
gA
σ 1 - λð Þ∂U σð Þ; ðA:5Þ
∂ τσ +ψσð Þ≥0 , ∂ψσj j≤
ϕ
gA 1 - τσ -ψσ - θð Þ
1 + 1 - λð ÞU σð Þð Þ + σ 1 - λð Þ∂U σð Þ½ :
The last condition is always veriﬁed if j ∂ψσ j ≤ððϕÞ=ðgAð1 - τσ -ψσ - θÞÞÞ 1 + 1 - λð ÞU 0ð Þ½  as
U(.) is increasing and ∂U σð Þ≥0. This last condition is a sufﬁcient condition for ∂nσ<0.This also
gives an upper bound in the neighborhood of σ ¼ 0:
∂ψσj j≤
ϕ
gA 1 -ψ0 - θð Þ
1 + 1 - λð ÞU 0ð Þ½ :
Note that due to the convexity of Ψ(.), if this condition is satisﬁed for σ ¼ 0, it is satisﬁed for all
(sustainable) σ.
Case 2 ð1 - λÞψσ<λΘ.In this case, ∂U σð Þ can be negative. We still can show in that case that
∂nσ<0 for σ! 0. Take the limit of Equation A.5 when σ! 0:
∂τσ 1 -ψ0 - θð Þ ¼
ϕ
gA
1 + 1 - λð ÞU 0ð Þð Þ + ϕ
gA
1 - λð Þ σ∂U σð Þð Þσ¼0:
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Using ∂U σð Þð Þσ¼0¼ βðð∂τσðð1 - λÞψ0 - λΘÞ - ∂ψσΘÞ=ððψ0β + λðΘ +ψ0ÞÞ2ÞÞ, we get:
∂τσ 1 -ψ0 - θ + λΘ - 1 - λð Þψ0ð Þσ
ϕ
gA
1 - λð Þβ
ψ0β + λ Θ +ψ0ð Þð Þ2
 !
¼ ϕ
gA
1 + 1 - λð ÞU 0ð Þð Þ:
Thus, for σ! 0,
∂τσ ¼ ϕgA
1 + 1 - λð ÞU 0ð Þ
1 -ψ0 - θ
 
: (A.6)
Using Equation A.6, Equation A.4 can be rewritten as follows for σ! 0:
ψ0 1 + βð Þ +Θð Þϕ∂nσ ¼ - ∂ψσ ψ0 β + λð Þ + λΘ -
1 - λð ÞβΘ 1 -ψ0 - θð Þ
ψ0 1 + βð Þ +Θ
 	
-
ϕ
gA
ψ0 1 + βð Þ +Θ
1 -ψ0 - θð Þ
+
1 - λð Þβ 1 - λð Þψ0 - λΘð Þ
ψ0 β + λð Þ + λΘ
 	
:
Note that (ψ0(1+β)+Θ)/((1−ψ0−θ))+((1−λ)β((1−λ)ψ0−λΘ))/(ψ0(β+λ)+λΘ)>0 if α≥(β)/(1+2β).
To see that, note that this term is minimal for ψ0= 0 and equal to: (Θ)/(1−θ)−(1−λ)β. This last
term is strictly positive if α≥(β)/(1+2β). Thus ∂nσ<0 if:
∂ψσj j≤
ϕ 1 + 1 - λð ÞU 0ð Þ½ 
gA 1 -ψ0 - θð Þ
1 - 1 - λð Þβ λΘ - 1 - λð Þψ0ð Þ 1 -ψ0 - θð Þψ0 β + λð Þ + λΘð Þ ψ0 1 + βð Þ +Θð Þ
1 - 1- λð ÞβΘ 1 -ψ0 - θð Þψ0 1+ βð Þ +Θð Þ ψ0β + λ Θ +ψ0ð Þð Þð Þ

:
This inequality is strictly satisﬁed if:
∂ψσj j≤
ϕ 1 + 1λð ÞU 0ð Þ½ 
gA 1 -ψ0 - θð Þ
1 - 1 - λð Þ 1 - θð Þ 1 - α
α
β
1 + β
 
;
where the right-hand side is strictly positive for α≥(β)/(1+2β).To conclude, under the (realistic)
assumption that the condition α≥(β)/(1+2β) is satisﬁed, let us deﬁne
M  1 + 1 - λð ÞU 0ð Þ½  1 - 1 - λð Þ 1 - θð Þ 1 - α
α
β
1 + β
 
>0: (A.7)
If j ∂ψσ j <ððϕÞ=ðgAÞÞM, we have ∂nσ<0 in the neighborhood of σ ¼ 0 for any value of the
parameters (ψ0, v).
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